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Abstract 
This paper empirically assesses the effect of liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal 
sector. The analysis is restricted to end-to-end competition. The effect on the incentives to innovate of 
public ownership, letter volume, and other control variables is also tested. Data on liberalisation, 
competition and innovation in the postal sector is collected for seventeen European countries, over ten 
years. Three measures are used as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation index based on a survey 
conducted for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on the same survey); and 
(3) labour productivity. We also develop a liberalisation index in order to measure the percentage of 
market liberalised (in terms of letter volume). Several models are estimated by GLS and using PW-
PCSE. In general, the models estimated have a high explanatory power. We find evidence that market 
liberalisation has a positive effect on innovation and that an increase in the market share of the 
competitors stimulates the investment in innovation, at least until the market share of the competitors 
reaches a certain threshold. Letter volume is also significant and has a positive impact on innovation. 
GDP per capita turns out to be significant and to have a positive relationship with innovation in all the 
models estimated.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European postal sector has been undergoing a process of reform over the past decade. The 
progressive liberalisation of the sector is the most important feature of this reform. One of the major 
motivations for liberalisation is the belief that competition stimulates process innovation, product 
innovation, encourages efficiency, and drives prices down.  
In this paper a clear distinction is made between liberalisation and competition. Liberalisation is 
understood as the relaxation or abolishment of previous legal barriers to entry. We are not only 
concerned with the relationship between competition and innovation, but also with the impact of 
liberalisation per se on the incentives to innovate.  
The literature on the relationship between competition and innovation does not have a clear answer as 
to whether competition stimulates innovation or not. Increased competition is said to have both 
positive and negative effects on innovation. The positive effect is a result of the firm’s quest to 
optimize profits through increasing its efficiency and reducing its cost of production. Profitability 
pushes the development and adoption of more efficient technologies and processes. At the same time, 
competition decreases the rents of the monopolist and might reduce its market share. Therefore, 
revenue will also decrease. As a result, firms will have fewer resources to invest, for instance, in 
research and development. Similarly, they are also likely to encounter more difficulties when trying to 
recover potential investment into new technologies and new processes (not sufficient economies of 
scale). The lack of consensus is more apparent when the theoretical results are compared with the 
empirical results. The need for empirical evidence is undisputable.  
Regarding the effect of liberalisation on innovation, we argue that it depends on the presence and 
intensity of natural barriers to entry on the supply side and on the mechanisms implemented to 
overcome those barriers. If there are no strong barriers to entry, then there is potential competition 
and, consequently a positive effect on innovation. If there are barriers to entry yet there is regulation 
capable of overcoming those barriers and making the threat of competition real, then liberalisation will 
have a positive impact on innovation. On the contrary, if there are barriers to entry and no mechanisms 
to make the threat of competition real, then liberalisation will not have any effect on innovation.   
To our knowledge, neither the effects of competition, nor the effects of liberalisation on incumbent’s 
innovation have ever been assessed empirically in the postal sector. This paper aims at filling this gap. 
Due to the lack of quantitative data on upstream and downstream access the analysis is restrict to end-
to-end competition.  
To this end data on liberalisation, competition and innovation in the postal sector was collected for 
seventeen European countries over ten years. An econometric analysis was then performed. The 
explanatory variables of interest are the percentage of market liberalised (based on the evolution of the 
reserved area) and the market shares of the competitors. We control for letter volume, percentage of 
public ownership, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and population density. Regarding the 
data on incumbent’s innovation, seventeen critical innovations were identified and the historical 
operators were inquired, through a survey, about their date of introduction. Based on this information 
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an innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations were computed. Additionally, labour 
productivity was also computed.  
Several models were estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and using Prais-Winsten 
estimation with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PW-PCSE). The three innovation proxies mentioned 
above were used as dependent variable and the results were compared. In general, the models 
estimated have a high explanatory power. We find that the percentage of market liberalised is 
statistically significant and has a positive effect on innovation. Regarding competition, the market 
share of the competitors is also significant and has a positive relationship with the investment in 
innovation. This result is valid at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain 
threshold, which was not attained yet in the postal sector. Letter volume is also significant and has a 
positive impact on innovation. GDP per capita turns out to be significant and to have a positive sign in 
all the models estimated.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Firstly, the related literature is summarised and the 
hypotheses being tested are presented. Then, the data used is described in detail. Particular attention is 
given to the measures of innovation used, namely to the innovation index and to the liberalisation 
index. Next, the model and the estimation procedures are presented. Finally, the results are discussed. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION AND COMPETITION ON 
INNOVATION 
As already mentioned, increased competition is likely to have both positive and negative effects on 
innovation. On the one hand, competition obliges firms to increase its efficiency and to reduce its cost 
of production in order to optimize profits (the positive effect). On the other hand, competition 
decreases the rents of the monopolist and may reduce its market share, which leaves fewer resources 
available to invest in new processes and technologies and creates more difficulties to recover 
investments. 
Felisberto (2007) develops and analysis a model of incumbent network operator when the incumbent 
is a monopolist as well as when it faces an entrant. The objectives of the incumbent are specified in a 
general manner to allow for revenue, profit, and/or welfare maximisation. The marginal cost of the 
incumbent is assumed to depend on the investment in new technologies. A strictly convex and 
decreasing cost function is assumed. The incumbent maximises its objective function with respect to 
prices and to investment in innovation. The entrant is assumed to maximise profits with respect to 
prices. The incumbent’s incentives to innovate under monopoly and duopoly are compared. The main 
results are that the difference between the investment in innovation under monopoly and duopoly is 
governed by the incumbent’s market share under duopoly and by the incumbent’s elasticity of demand 
under monopoly and duopoly. For a certain market share interval, duopoly provides more incentives 
than monopoly. This interval depends on the other model parameters and, in particular, on the 
elasticity of demand of the incumbent. Outside this interval, it is the monopoly that generates more 
investment in innovation by the incumbent. The incumbent’s elasticity of demand has a negative effect 
on the incentives to innovate under both market structures. Another major result is that the incentives 
to innovate decrease as the weight given to revenue and/or to profit increase. In other words, the more 
regulation can move the incumbent to act as a welfare maximiser, the larger the investment in 
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innovation is. This conclusion (that regulatory intervention which motivates the incumbent to act like 
a welfare-maximising firm favours innovation) is independent of the market share of the incumbent. 
The debate about the influence of the intensity of market competition on technical progress started 
with Schumpeter (1942) and continued with Arrow (1962). Schumpeter argues that monopoly favours 
the development of R&D activities because it provides the necessary cash flow to invest in such 
activities and reduces uncertainty in the market. Twenty years later Arrow investigated the effects of 
market structure on the firm’s incentives to invest in R&D in order to reduce costs. Arrow concluded 
that under competition the single firm gets more benefits from innovation than under monopoly. The 
intuition behind this result is that under monopoly, part of the benefits coming from innovation serve 
only to replace the monopolist’s rents earned before innovating, i.e. the monopolist has greater 
opportunity costs of innovating. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990) support 
Schumpeter’s view that monopoly is a precondition for innovation by arguing that firms innovate 
because they seek profitable opportunities that arise from monopoly. On the contrary, Nickell (1996) 
and Boone and Dijk (1998) support the existence of a positive relationship between competition and 
innovation. 
Other authors have elaborated on the relationship between competition and innovation, introducing 
additional factors like the value of the innovation and the level of fixed and variable costs. Kamien and 
Schwartz ((1975), (1976)) show that for inventions of small value, the absence of rivalry leads to the 
most rapid development, while a positive level of rivalry will achieve this for more valuable 
innovations. Loury (1979) finds that, under certain conditions, the incentives to invest in R&D of 
individual firms decrease as competition increases. The work developed by Lee and Wilde (1980) 
reaches rather different conclusions from Loury (1979). The authors conclude that an increase in 
rivalry increases the equilibrium individual R&D effort. In an attempt to reconcile this conclusion with 
Loury’s earlier work, the authors show that if fixed costs in the R&D technology are larger than the 
variable costs, then an increase in competition leads to a decrease in the equilibrium level of firm 
investment in R&D.  
Other authors have made a distinction between individual and industry innovation or investment in 
R&D, and find a positive effect of competition on aggregate innovation and a negative effect of 
competition on individual innovation (Cellini and Lambertini, 2005, Blundell et al., 1999). 
Between Schumpeter’s followers and Arrow’s defenders, a third group of authors emerged who have 
attempted to combine the previous arguments in order to rationalise the “inverted-U” relationship 
between market concentration and R&D and technological advance found by some authors in the 
empirical studies. Scherer (1967) observes that the speed of technological research accelerates with 
rivalry, provided that the number of firms competing is not excessive. Scherer is the first to suggest an 
inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Later on, Boone ((2000), (2001)) and 
Aghion et al. (2005) also find a nonlinear relationship between competition and innovation. Aghion et 
al. (2005) confirm the inverted-U relationship between intensity of competition and R&D incentives.   
Based on the literature on the relationship between competition and innovation as well as on the theory 
of contestable markets, we argue that if there is liberalisation with only potential competition than 
there is a positive impact on innovation. Potential competition exists when: (1) there are no strong 
barriers to entry on the supply side, however, actual competition does not develop; or (2) there are 
barriers to entry yet there is regulation capable of overcoming those barriers and making the threat of 
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competition real. When the threat of competition is not real, liberalisation has no effect on innovation.  
Liberalisation results in no potential or actual competition (threat of competition is not real) when 
there are strong barriers to entry on the supply side and no mechanisms are put in place to overcome 
those barriers.  
This paper tests the following hypotheses that follow from the literature and in particular from 
Felisberto (2007): 
Hypothesis 1: Liberalisation in the postal sector has stimulated operators to be more efficient and 
therefore, more innovative. Behind this hypothesis it is the assumption that there are no strong barriers 
to entry, namely sunk costs, on the supply side of the postal sector. 
Hypothesis 2: When the incumbents preserve a relatively high market share competition favours 
innovation. Therefore, a positive effect of end-to-end competition on innovation and efficiency is 
expected because the incumbents analysed here kept market shares of at least 90%.  
Hypothesis 3: A decrease in public ownership is expected to have a negative impact on innovation 
under the assumption that public ownership is the most likely ownership structure to promote welfare 
maximisation. 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the amount of goods and services (letter volume) provided, the more efficient 
and innovative the operator is. 
In the following section, the data used is described and analysed. 
3. DATA ANALYSIS 
The dataset presented here results from the compilation of different sources and from a survey 
conducted by the author. It constitutes a unique source of information for analysing the liberalisation 
process, the development of competition, and the development of incumbents’ innovation in the postal 
sector in the last decade. 
We collected data to measure the degree of liberalisation and competition in the postal market, and the 
innovativeness of the incumbents (including the letter mail volume and the average number of 
employees). Some additional variables, namely the percentage of capital owned by the state, 
population density, and GDP per capita, were also collected. 
All of these variables were collected for the period between 1995 and 2005 (some were also collected 
for 2006), in seventeen European countries and operators:  
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Table 1: Countries and operators included in sample. 
Country Operator 
Bulgaria (BG) Bulgarian Posts plc 
Croatia (HR) Hrvatska pošta d.d. 
Estonia (EE) Eesti Post Ltd 
Finland (FI) Itella Oyj 
France (FR) La Poste 
Germany (DE) Deutsche Post AG 
Ireland (IE) An Post 
Italy (IT) Poste Italiane S.p.A. 
Latvia (LV) Latvijas Pasts 
Poland (PL) Poczta Polska 
Portugal (PT) CTT - Correios de Portugal, S.A. 
Romania (RO) C.N. Posta Romana S.A. 
Spain (ES) Correos y Telégrafos S.A. 
Sweden (SE) Posten AB 
Switzerland (CH) Die Post/La Poste/La Posta 
The Netherlands (NL) TNT Post 
United Kingdom (UK) Royal Mail Group PLC 
 
The data used to build the liberalisation index is available in several studies mandated by the European 
Commission, as well as the regulators’ reports, the annual reports of the operators, and the 
International Post Corporation (IPC) regulatory database. The same sources were used to collect the 
data on the degree of competition, i.e. market shares. 
The data necessary to build the innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations, two of 
the three measures of innovation used, was collected through a survey (see Annex 1). In that survey 
the incumbents were asked about the data of introduction of 17 critical innovations identified by the 
author. 
We first analyse the different measures of innovation and the liberalisation index. After, we examine 
the degree of competition and the remaining variables. 
3.1  Measures of innovation 
Three proxies for innovation are used: an innovation index (inindex), the accumulated number of 
innovations (accuminno), and labour productivity (itemperempl).  
The innovation index developed in this thesis aims to measure innovativeness in the postal sector. It 
corresponds to the average delay or advance, in years, in introducing the critical innovations. 
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If a certain innovation was already introduced by a country (called the pioneer country) and the 
country being analysed did not introduce that innovation yet, then the latter will be penalised with the 
number of years that elapsed from the year the innovation was first introduced until the year in 
question. On the contrary, if the country being analysed has already introduced a certain innovation, 
then it is beneficed with the number of years that elapsed from the year that country introduced the 
innovation until the year in question. 
In this way, it was computed for each country and each year the number of years the country is, on 
average, late or advanced in introducing the critical innovations (the same weight was given to all 
innovations). 
The pioneer country is identified among the seventeen countries plus the United States of America1. 
In our sample, the innovation index ranges from -18 until 18, which are the maximum average delay 
and the maximum average advance a country can have, respectively. 
This measure is richer than the simple count of the number of innovations because it takes into 
account whether the innovation is more or less recent i.e. it takes into account the year the innovation 
was first introduced. As explained before, for each year that elapses without the introduction of an 
innovation, the country is penalised. Hence, in order to ensure a symmetric treatment of the 
innovations that were already introduced relative to the ones that were not, a country must benefit for 
each year that elapses from the introduction of an innovation. 
The innovation index and the accumulated number of innovations are based on the date of introduction 
of the following seventeen critical innovations, supplied by the incumbents through a questionnaire: 
• Optimisation of collection routes (using software) 
• Hybrid mail 
• Digital stamp 
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) used to identify trucks 
• RFID used to identify trolleys 
• RFID used to identify trays or bags 
• RFID used to monitor the performance of the letter post 
• Automated sorting machines using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) that can read whole front 
side of the letter 
• OCR that can read hand-written whole addresses 
• OCR that can read hand-written postal codes 
• OCR that can read machine written postal codes and whole addresses 
                                                     
1  The USA is not included in the econometric analysis because it does not have end-to-end competition. 
However, the USA was considered when deciding the date of introduction by the pioneering country 
because, traditionally, the USA has indeed been the pioneer country introducing new technologies and 
processes. 
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• Video coded address reading equipment: online coding 
• Video coded address reading equipment: scanning and remote coding (off-line video coding 
equipment) 
• Automated sequence sorting to delivery route 
• Automatic tray handling systems 
• Automated guided vehicles (AGV) 
• Route planning and optimization software for delivery 
These seventeen critical innovations were identified through the literature (Arthur D. Little Limited, 
2004, Wik, 2004, Nera, 2004, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1997), the annual reports of the operators, and 
interviews with experts in the postal sector2. Firstly, the ensemble of the more significant innovations 
was listed. Secondly, the more recent innovations and the ones that have more impact on costs and 
costumers’ satisfaction were selected.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the innovation index for the ensemble of the countries.  
                                                     
2  Mr. Josef Bösch, CEO Postmail, Swiss Post;  Mr. Michel Kunz, CEO Logistics, Swiss Post; Mr. Peter Stoop, 
Responsible Business Technology Center, Swiss Post; Mr. Kenneth Lützelschwab, Responsible REMA 
project, Swiss Post; Mr. Pedro Saldanha, Business Strategy and Development, CTT Correios de Portugal, 
S.A. 
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Figure 1: Innovation index. 
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The countries with larger technological delay are Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, and Latvia. Italy, 
Romania, and the United Kingdom used to have an innovation index much lower than the average. 
However, in 2003 both the United Kingdom and Italy invert the negative trend and, in 2004, Romania 
does it too. Today the United Kingdom is above the average, Italy just reached the average and 
Romania is very close to it.  
The innovation delay/advance introducing the critical innovations of the incumbents from Switzerland, 
Finland, Ireland, Poland, and Portugal have been around the average throughout the period of study.   
Spain, Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Sweden have registered an innovation index above the 
average.  
We now analyse the second measure of innovation: the accumulated number of innovations. This 
variable corresponds to the number of innovations, among the critical innovations, that were 
implemented until the year in analysis. Figure 2 displays the evolution of the accumulated number of 
innovations for the seventeen countries. The evolution of this variable is consistent with the evolution 
of the innovation index. 
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Figure 2: Accumulated number of innovations. 
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Finally, we consider the third measure of innovation: labour productivity. This variable is equal to the 
letter mail volume (in thousands) divided by the average number of employees.  
The data on the volume of letter mail in billions of items (tvolume), which includes domestic and 
international correspondence, registered items, insured letters, newspapers, as well as addressed and 
unaddressed advertising items, is available through the UPU database.  
Figure 3 shows that there have been some small fluctuations in the volumes yet not significant ones. 
The impact of electronic substitution on mail volumes has been weaker than predicted by some 
operators. The expectations are that letter post will become more a means of distribution of direct mail 
than for exchange of correspondence. The direct mail growth should partially compensate for the loss 
of correspondence and transaction mail (Wik, 2005). 
The French market is the one with the larger letter mail volume, followed by the British and the 
Deutsch markets. For the remaining countries, the letter mail volumes are below 7 billion items per 
year, in 2005. France, the United Kingdom and Portugal have experienced growing mail volumes. The 
total average has also been increasing slightly. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
year
le
tte
r v
ol
um
e 
(b
ill
io
ns
)
FR DE NL UK PT total average
 
Figure 3: Evolution of letter mail volumes. 
 
The average number of employees (includes permanent employees and employees with a term 
contract) in thousands (empl) was also collected from the UPU database except for Latvia Post. The 
average number of employees of Latvia Post was collected from Amadeus database.  
The countries with the largest number of employees are Germany, France and the United Kingdom 
(Figure 4). These three countries are also the ones with larger volumes as observed before. Italy stands 
out because it has a relatively large number of employees although its letter mail volume is around the 
average of the countries being studied. The same happens with Poland whose letter mail volumes are 
approximately half of the average, whereas its number of employees is very close to the average. 
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Figure 4: Average number of employees for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. 
The average number of employees corresponds to the whole company since there was no data 
available by segments.  
The measure “labour productivity” presents some drawbacks, which are important to keep in mind. 
Firstly, labour productivity was computed with the total number of employees and not only the 
employees working in the letter segment. The consequences of this is that a postal operator with a 
large diversification of products and where financial services, for instance, have a large weight will 
have a relatively small labour productivity. 
Secondly, an increase in mail volume does not trigger a proportional increase in the number of 
employees because the postal services are characterised by economies of scale and scope. Therefore, 
comparisons among countries with different mail volumes have to be cautious.  
It must also be considered that sometimes firms can not lay-off as soon as there is a decrease in 
volumes, which may cause a decrease in labour productivity. 
The evolution of labour productivity is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Labour productivity (thousands of items per employee). 
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Since labour productivity is generated from completely different data than the innovation index, it is 
interesting to compare both measures.  
Bulgaria has a labour productivity below the average, which is consistent with the technological delay 
introducing the seventeen innovations mentioned before. In the same situation are: Estonia, Croatia, 
Italy, Latvia, and Romania. In Estonia, however, the innovation index is deviating more and more 
from the average while labour productivity is approaching the average. In Latvia, the innovation index 
is also deviating more and more from the average whereas labour productivity remains more or less 
stable. 
The evolution of labour productivity for the French, Dutch, Spanish, Swedish, Finnish, and Irish 
incumbents is also consistent with the evolution of the innovation index. The French, Dutch, Spanish, 
and Swedish incumbents have an innovation index above the average and their labour productivity is 
larger than the average labour productivity. In Finland and Ireland, both measures of innovation have 
always been very close to the average. 
In Germany, the innovation index has always been above the average whereas labour productivity has 
been decreasing and is now below the average. 
Switzerland and Portugal have registered, through the years studied, an innovation index close to the 
average while their labour productivity has always been above the average. In Portugal labour 
productivity has been steadily increasing.  
In Poland, there is a divergence between the two indexes: the innovation delay is close to the average 
while labour productivity has always been below the average. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, the innovation index was very low until 2003, when it started to 
increase, while labour productivity has always been above the average. 
3.2 Measuring the degree of liberalisation 
In 1998, the European Postal Directive 97/67/EC was implemented, which  sets the maximum weight 
limit of the reserved area at 350 grams for items of correspondence and the price limit at five times the 
basic tariff for a first class letter in the lowest weight band. The directive 2002/39/EC reduces the 
reserved area to items of correspondence that weigh less than 100 grams and cost less than three times 
the basic tariff as of January 1st, 2003, and to 50 grams and two and a half times the basic tariff as of 
January 1st, 2006. Furthermore, the outgoing cross-border mail is required to open to competition on 
January 1st, 2006 but exceptions are accepted if needed to ensure universal service. Directive 
2002/39/EC sets the full market opening of the postal markets for January 1st, 2009, subject to 
confirmation by the European Parliament and the Council. In 2007, the European Parliament voted to 
delay the full market opening until January 1st, 2011. The new member states and posts that work in 
difficult terrain can delay full liberalisation for a further two years. 
The aim of the European Commission is the gradual market opening of the postal sector within the 
European Union. Besides the definition of the maximum reserved area the directives also set a 
minimum universal service, the conditions determining the provision of non-reserved services and 
access to the network, tariff principles and the transparency of accounts, minimums for quality of 
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service, the harmonisation of technical standards. Moreover, directive 97/67/EC required the creation 
of independent national regulatory authorities. 
The letter post items can be divided into four categories: items of correspondence, addressed printed 
matter, newspapers, and un-addressed printed matter (i.e. un-addressed direct mail). Items of 
correspondence include letters, postcards, and  transaction mail such as bills and bank statements. 
Included in addressed printed matter are: addressed direct mail, catalogues, and magazines or 
periodicals. 
The reserved area includes the clearance, sorting, transport and delivery of items of domestic and 
incoming cross-border correspondence. It may also include direct mail (addressed items only) and 
outgoing cross-border mail falling in the same weight and price limits to the extent necessary to ensure 
the maintenance of universal service. There are nevertheless exceptions to this reserved area. Among 
the countries at study, Germany and Ireland exclude the collection and transportation of mail to a post 
office for final delivery from the reserved area. France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain exempt “special services” (i.e. services that are “distinct from the universal service”) from 
the reserved area. Also, Portugal does not include “day certain” delivery in the reserved area (Wik, 
2006).  
The liberalisation index (mktliberalised) developed in this thesis to measure the degree of 
liberalisation in the postal sector corresponds to the percentage of letter mail volume opened to 
competition. The index refers only to items of correspondence and addressed direct mail. It takes into 
account whether the following categories are part of the reserved area:  
• domestic and inbound cross-border correspondence (weight criteria transformed in percentage of 
mail liberalised according to Table 2) 
• local intra-city mail 
• direct mail 
• outbound cross-border correspondence. 
Each category was given a weight according to the composition of the mail market in physical terms 
(Table 3). 
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Table 2: Correspondence between reserved area and percentage of letter mail volume liberalised (domestic and 
inbound cross border correspondence). 
Weight limit of the 
reserved area 
Percentage of mail 
volume 
>0g 100 
>50g 25* 
>100g 18* 
>150g 14 
>200g 10 
>350g 7* 
>500g 2 
>1000g 1 
>2000g 0 
                                                   * Wik (2004) 
Table 3: Composition of the mail market in physical terms. 
  Domestic and 
inbound CB 
Direct mail Outbound CB 
FR 74% 23% 2% 
DE 62% 37% 2% 
ES 75% 21% 4% 
SE 73% 23% 4% 
CH 66% 31% 3% 
NL 76% 20% 4% 
UK 69% 28% 3% 
US 73% 26% 0% 
PT 81% 15% 4% 
BG 88% 10% 1% 
CZ 76% 21% 3% 
HR 62% 37% 1% 
EE 85% 11% 4% 
FI 77% 22% 1% 
IE 82% 7% 11% 
IT 67% 32% 1% 
LV 93% 4% 4% 
PL 92% 5% 3% 
RO 75% 24% 2% 
                                       Source: Ecorys (2005) 
Before the Postal Directive 97/67/EC, the incumbents retained monopolies for letters, generally up to 
1 or 2 kilograms. It was assumed that the maximum reserved area for domestic and incoming cross-
border mail was two kilograms.Figure 6 displays the evolution of the liberalisation index for the 
seventeen countries.  
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Figure 6: Liberalisation index. 
Spain was, among the countries at study, the first one to liberalise a considerable part of its letter 
market. In the 1960s the intra-city mail in Spain was fully opened to competition. For decades, the 
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reserved area in Spain has been restricted to letters and postcards that are inter-urban or international. 
Therefore, the Spanish market is one of the most competitive European postal markets.  
The liberalisation process in Sweden started in 1985 when the Swedish government established quality 
and profitability as the objectives of Posten. Posten was given more freedom in the capital markets in 
1987 and measures of consumer satisfaction were put in place. Five years later, Posten was given the 
freedom to set prices within certain limits, and in 1993 the letter monopoly was abolished (Price 
Waterhouse, 1997). Since then, the market share of the incumbent (Posten) has been declining. Today, 
the most important private operator (CityMail) has a market share of approximately 8.5%.  
Estonia and Finland have also fully liberalised their postal market. Finland took the decision to fully 
liberalise the mail market in 1991, which took effect in 1994. Estonia liberalised its mail market in 
2002. However, competition has not developed in these countries due mainly to restrictive licence 
conditions and taxation.  
In the United Kingdom, the Postal Services Act 2000 abolished the reserved area and from January 1st, 
2006, the Postal Services Commission (“Postcomm”) grants licenses to all operators subject only to 
compliance with certain essential requirements, instead of only bulk mail providers and certain other 
special categories of postal services operators as before 2006 (Eccles and Kuipers, 2006). 
In 2004 the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst published a paper on the 
future of postal policy in the Netherlands3. In this paper, he defends the full market opening of the 
Dutch market in 2007, but conditioned on the full liberalisation of the British and German markets. He 
justifies this position by the need to create a level playing field (Wik, 2004). 
In Germany, letter items weighting more than 200 grams became open to competition in 1998. 
Regarding direct mail, the weight limit was firstly reduced in 1995 to 250 grams, then in 1996 to 100 
grams, and finally in 1998 to 50 grams.  
The liberalisation of direct mail is particularly interesting because direct mail represents a great share 
of the total volume of letter mail. Eight of the countries analysed here - Croatia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and Switzerland - have maintained a reserved area over direct mail 
(IPC, 2007). In Italy and The Netherlands, addressed direct mail is liberalised and substantial 
competition can be observed in this segment. 
The definition of direct mail is not homogeneous in all the countries. In the Netherlands direct mail 
corresponds only to wholly printed matter whereas, for instance, in Germany items of direct mail can 
differ in respect to specific elements. In Spain and Italy, direct mail is defined as items whose body is 
“essentially identical”. The Directive considers as direct mail the advertising items where the nature of 
the message is the same even if there are other elements specific to each item (Wik, 2006).  
Among the countries at study, seven also reserve outgoing mail. These countries are Bulgaria, Italy 
Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain (IPC, 2007).  
                                                     
3  « Postal Memorandum » available at http://www.ez.nl/content.jsp?objectid=20863 [8/10/2007]. 
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3.3 The degree of competition 
The degree of competition is measured through the market share of the competitor postal operators (in 
terms of volume) (mktshareE) in addressed mail delivery, including both reserved and non-reserved 
areas. The sources of the market share of the entrants are the following: Ecorys (2005), Wik (2004), 
Bundesnetzagentur (2006), and the Swedish regulator.  
mktshareE is a discrete variable that assumes the values 1,3,5,7,9, and 11. These values correspond to 
the mid point of the interval to which belongs the market share of the entrants. For example, if entrants 
have a market share that lies on the interval [0,2%] then mktshareE assumes the value 1. If entrants 
have a market share that lies on the interval (2%,4%] then mktshareE assumes the value 3, and so on. 
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the market share of the entrants between 1995 and 2005.  
In the majority of the countries under study the entrants’ market share does not exceed the 2%.  
Spain is the country where competition is highest, followed by Sweden. Although Finland and Estonia 
liberalised their mail markets some years ago, the restrictive licence conditions and taxation policy has 
restricted the development of competition. In both countries, potential entrants are required to provide 
postal services in the whole territory of the country4. In Finland, potential entrants can opt for a 
restricted license that implies an additional turnover tax of 5-20%, depending on the territorial 
coverage of mail delivery.  
The license requirements to deliver addressed mail in Sweden are not restrictive. Moreover, there are 
no licence requirements to deliver catalogues, magazines and un-addressed mail. However, not a lot of 
competition has developed and the incumbent still has a very dominant position currently. This slow 
development of competition is related to different factors. Initially, the legislation was not adapted to 
support or create the preconditions for competition. Also, CityMail (the largest competitor of Posten 
AB) faced numerous internal problems that limited its business development and expansion. Finally, 
Sweden has a large territory with a low population density, which creates barriers to entry (Ecorys, 
2005). 
After Spain and Sweden, the countries where competition is most developed are Germany, The 
Netherlands, and Estonia. 
 
                                                     
4  With the exception of the Aland islands in Finland. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of entrants’ market share. 
 
3.4 Other variables 
In addition to the main variables of interest described above, we also collected data on the following 
control variables: percentage of public ownership, population density, and GDP per capita. 
The share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central governments (publick) was collected from 
the operators’ annual reports, the IPC Postal regulatory databases, and the operators’ websites. Among 
the countries at study, only Deutsche Post and TNT Post are partially privatised. In 2005, the Deutsche 
government held 45% of the shares of Deutsche Post and only 10% of the shares of TNT Post were 
owned (directly or indirectly) by the Dutch government. 
Population (in millions) was collected from Eurostat and countries’ area is available at the UPU 
database. These two variables were used to build the variable population density (popdens), which is 
plotted in Figure 8, together with population. Population density is in number of habitants per squared 
kilometre. France, Germany, UK, and Italy are the countries with the greatest populations. These 
countries, except France, are among the four countries with the highest population density. The 
Netherlands is the country with the highest population density. 
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Figure 8: Population and population density in 2005. 
 
The GDP at 1995 prices was collected from Eurostat’s statistics and used to compute the variable GDP 
per capita (gdppercap). GDP per capita is in thousands of euros per habitant. Figure 9 displays the 
GDP per capita and GDP in 2005. The countries with the highest GDPs are Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy, whereas the countries with the largest GDP per capita are Switzerland, 
Sweden, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
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Figure 9: GDP per capita and GDP in 2005. 
 
Finally, both exchange rates and inflation rates are from Eurostat. 
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Table 4 summarises and describes the variables involved in this study. 
 
Table 4: Variables’ description. 
Variable Description 
inindex Innovation index 
accuminno Accumulated number of innovations 
itemperempl Labour productivity 
tvolume Volume of letter mail (in billions of items) 
empl Average number of employees (includes permanent employees 
and employees with a term contract) (in thousands) 
mktliberalised Liberalisation index (measures the degree of liberalisation, i.e 
the percentage of letter mail volume opened to competition) 
mktshareE Market share of the competitor postal operators (in terms of 
volume) 
publick Share of equity owned directly or indirectly by central 
governments 
popdens Population density 
GDP per capitagdppercap
 
The detailed descriptive statistics are presented in Annex 2, Table 6. 
4. THE MODEL 
In this section we present the econometric model estimated in order to test the hypotheses presented in 
section 2. Its general form is: 
 
1 it 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 itInnovation Xit i t i t itmktliberalised mktliberalised C eα β β β β− += + + + + +  
 
where t represents years, i denotes countries, α  is a constant term,  is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables, and C  is the vector of control variables.  
itX
it
The contemporaneous explanatory variables included in the vector  are: itX mktliberalised and 
mktshareE. Vector C  includes: it publick, tvolume, popdens, and gdppercap. 
This model is estimated for the three different measures of innovation presented before, which are: the 
innovation index (inindex), the accumulated number of innovation (accuminno), and labour 
productivity (itemperempl). 
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The aim of lagging and forwarding mktliberalised one period is to test if firms react with delay to 
liberalisation policies or if firms anticipate future changes regarding the market liberalisation, 
respectively. 
The correlation matrix between independent variables is displayed in Annex 2, Table 7. The 
percentage of market liberalised and the percentage of market share of the entrants have a correlation 
of 54%. Although this correlation is not extremely high, it must be noted that the inclusion of these 
two variables in the same specification might affect t-statistics. The correlation between mktliberalised 
and popdens is -34% and, therefore, caution must be taken when including both variables in the same 
model. All the other variables have a correlation with mktliberalised smaller than 25% and therefore 
should not cause any problems. 
Regarding mktshareE, its correlations with publick, tvolume, popdens, and gdppercap are smaller than 
25%. The correlation between publick and gdppercap slightly exceeds 25% (it is 28% in absolute 
value) and it should not cause problems either. However, publick and popdens have a high correlation 
of -73%, which deserves particular attention. It is likely that the inclusion of both variables in the same 
model will distort results, in particular t-statistics. The correlation between tvolume and popdens, as 
well as between tvolume and gdppercap, are close to 50% and, hence, there is a risk of impact on the t-
statistics. Finally, popdens and gdppercap have a correlation of 38%. 
We start by estimating a specification only with the contemporaneous variables and control variables. 
Then, a second model that excludes popdens, because of its correlation with mktliberalised, is 
estimated. After, we estimate a model that excludes gdppercap from the second model because of its 
correlation with tvolume. We then investigate if the t-statistics are being affected by the correlation 
between mktliberalised and mktshareE by estimating two other models: one with mktliberalised, 
publick, and tvolume as explanatory variables, and another one with mktshareE, publick, and tvolume 
as explanatory variables. 
5. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
Firstly, the models were tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity and correlation between and 
within panels. Table 8, in Annex 2, summarises the results of the tests performed.  
By plotting the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) residuals it is possible to see (independently of the 
variable used as proxy for innovation) that the means and the dispersion are different across countries. 
This finding confirms the existence of a panel structure. Also, the fact that the second moments are 
different across countries is a first indication of a problem of heteroskedasticity. 
A likelihood-ratio test (lrtest hetero) was performed in order to determine the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. In all the models, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected, which 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. For the purpose of learning more about the type of 
heteroskedasticity, namely to test for inter-individuals heteroskedasticity, a modified Wald test was 
performed (xttest3). The rejection of the null hypotheses confirms the existence of inter-individuals 
hereroskedasticity. 
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It is not possible to perform a Breusch-Pagan test (xttest2) in order to check for correlation across 
panels because the number of firms is larger than the number of time periods being analysed (i.e. 
N>T). Nevertheless, we will assume that there is spatial correlation in the errors since it is very 
common to find this type of correlation in panel data models. The first order autocorrelation test of 
Wooldridge (xtserial) indicates the presence of serial autocorrelation in the three models since the null 
hypothesis of independence of the residuals is rejected. 
In the presence of autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity, the 
most appropriated estimation procedures are Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and Prais-Winsten 
estimation with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PW-PCSE). Models 1 through 13,, in Annex 2, were 
estimated by GLS and models 14 through 19, in Annex 2, using PW-PCSE estimation. 
GLS allows estimation in the presence of a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)) within panels 
and cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity across panels. The coefficient of the AR(1) 
process can be specified as being common to all the panels or as being specific to each panel. We 
assume that the AR(1) coefficient is specific to each model. 
In the PCSE estimation, parameters are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Prais-Winsten 
regression. Prais-Winsten estimates are provided when autocorrelation is specified, which is the case. 
Otherwise, OLS estimates are provided. As with GLS, the coefficient of the AR(1) process can be 
specified with PCSE estimation as being common to all the panels or as being specific to each panel. 
Again, the AR(1) coefficient is assumed to be specific to each model.  
6. RESULTS 
In this section, the results are presented and discussed. A total of forty two models were estimated and 
reported in Annex 2 (Tables 8 through 13). Tables 8, 9, and 10 report the results of GLS estimation. 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 report the PW-PCSE estimation. In the models included in Tables 8 and 11 the 
dependent variable is the innovation index. Tables 9 and 12 contain the models that have the 
accumulated number of innovations as dependent variable. Finally, Tables 10 and 13 report the models 
that use labour productivity as proxy for innovation. Each table contains seven models. Schematically 
the models are as follows: 
Table 5: Scheme of the models estimated. 
Dependent variable Estimation procedure 
inindex accuminno itemperempl
table number 4 5 6 GLS 
model number 1-7 8-14 15-21 
table number 7 8 9 PW-PCSE 
model number 22-28 29-35 36-42 
 
In all the models estimated, the explanatory variables are found to be jointly significant. 
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6.1 Models estimated by GLS 
In the models estimated by GLS that include all the contemporaneous explanatory variables (including 
the control variables), the percentage of market liberalised is shown not to be significant (Models 1, 8, 
and 15). However, once the population density, which is correlated with mktliberalisedt, publickt, and 
tvolumet is taken out of these regressions, mktliberalisedt becomes statistically significant in two of the 
models (in Model 2 and 16, and not in Model 9). Only when gdppercapt (which is correlated with 
tvolumet and popdenst) is taken out of Model 9, mktliberalisedt becomes statistically significant (Model 
10).  
Concerning the remaining models that have the innovation index as dependent variable, it is observed 
that in Model 2, tvolumet is not statistically significant but when gdppercapt is excluded (Model 3), 
tvolumet becomes statistically significant at a 1% level. In Model 3, the marketshareEt and publickt are 
also statistically significant at a 1% level. 
With Model 4 and 5 we aim to test whether the correlation between mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt 
significantly affects the t-statistics. As one can observe, this is not the case.  
The objective of Models 6 and 7 is to analyse the response of innovation (measured through the 
innovation index) to non-contemporaneous changes in the percentage of market liberalised. Therefore, 
mktliberalisedt is replaced by mktliberalisedt-1 and mktliberalisedt+1. It is observed that both variables 
are statistically significant but they have a smaller impact on the innovation index than mktliberalisedt.  
Hence, from the set of models estimated using GLS and where innovation is measured through the 
innovation index, Model 3 is selected as the one that best fits the data.  
We now turn to the models that have the accumulated number of innovations as dependent variable 
and that have not yet been analysed. 
In Model 10, tvolumet also becomes statistically significant at a 1% level when gdppercapt is excluded 
from the vector of explanatory variables. marketshareEt remains statistically significant at a 1% level. 
However, publickt which was significant becomes not significant.  
When we estimate Models 11 and 12, which exclude mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt respectively, 
from the explanatory variables, it is seen that publickt becomes statistically significant at a 1% level 
again. Also, mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt have a more significant impact on the accumulated 
number of innovations when they are not included simultaneously in the same regression.  
mktliberalisedt+1 and mktliberalisedt-1 are both found to be statistically significant at a 1% level 
(Models 13 and 14). The coefficient of mktliberalisedt+1 is smaller than that of mktliberalisedt whereas 
the coefficient of mktliberalisedt-1 and its t-statistics are larger than that of mktliberalisedt. However, 
marketshareEt is no longer statistically significant in Model 14 (probably due to the correlation 
between mktliberalisedt-1 and marketshareEt).  
Concerning the set of models, which have the accumulated number of innovations as dependent 
variable and that are estimated using GLS, Model 10 seems to best fit the data. The likelihood-ratio 
test that compares Model 8 and Model 10 confirms that Model 10 fits the data better than Model 8 (LR 
chi2(2)=5.50 and Prob>chi2=0.064). When compare Model 10 is compared to Model 11, the 
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likelihood-ratio test indicates that Model 10 fits the data better (LR chi2(2)=4.43 and 
Prob>chi2=0.035). 
In the set of models estimated by GLS which use labour productivity as proxy for innovation (Table 
11) Model 16 seems to best fit the data.  
It is apparent that when mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt are included separately (Models 18 and 19) 
both variables are statistically significant at a 1% level while in Model 17 mktliberalisedt is not 
statistically significant. Model 16, despite including both mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt, and 
gdppercapt seems to display t-statistics that are not significantly influenced by the correlation between 
mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt, and between gdppercapt and tvolumet. In Model 16, marketshareEt, 
publickt, tvolumet, and gdppercapt are statistically significant at a 1% level.  
mktliberalisedt+1 is not statistically significant (Model 21) whereas mktliberalisedt-1 is found to be 
statistically significant at a 1% level (Model 21). The coefficient of mktliberalisedt-1 and its t-statistics 
are larger than that of mktliberalisedt. However, marketshareEt is no longer statistically significant in 
Model 21 (again, probably because of the correlation between mktliberalisedt-1 and marketshareEt). 
When Models 15, 16, 17, and 18 are compared using likelihood-ratio tests the results obtained are: (1) 
Model 16 fits the data better than Model 15 (LR chi2(2)=-5.51 and Prob>chi2=1); (2) Model 16 is 
preferable to Model 17 (LR chi2(2)=62.98 and Prob>chi2=0.000); and (3) Model 16 fits the data better 
than Model 18 (LR chi2(2)=180.76 and Prob>chi2=0.000). This confirms the perception that Model 
16 is the one that best fits the data. 
6.2 Models estimated using PW-PCSE 
We now turn to the estimations using PW-PCSE. We start with the models that have the innovation 
index as a dependent variable (Models 22 through 28). In all of these models, mktliberalisedt and 
marketshareEt are statistically significant at at least at a 5% level. mktliberalisedt+1 and mktliberalisedt-
1 are also found to be statistically significant (Models 27 and 28). Its coefficients and t-statistics are 
very close to those of mktliberalisedt in Model 23. Model 23 corresponds to Model 22 without the 
variable popdenst. publickt is not statistically significant in Model 22 but once popdenst is eliminated 
from the regression, publickt becomes significant.  
Taking gdppercapt out of the regression (Model 24) does not change things significantly. Since the 
coefficient of mktliberalisedt in Model 23 is closer to that in Model 25, Model 23 is preferred over 
Model 24. Models 25 and 26 show that the t-statistics are not much affected by the correlation 
between mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt. Model 23 is the model that has the highest R-squared. 
Models 29 through 35 correspond to PW-PCSE estimation with the accumulated number of 
innovations as the dependent variable. In this set of models, marketshareEt is always statistically 
significant while mktliberalisedt only becomes statistically significant once we exclude both popdenst 
and gdppercapt (Model 31). The same happens with tvolumet. publickt is statistically significant in 
Models 30 through 35. Again, the correlation between mktliberalisedt and marketshareEt does not 
noticeably affect the results in Model 31 since the coefficients and t-statistics of these two variables in 
Model 32 and 33 are very close to those of Model 31. In Model 35, mktliberalisedt-1 is found to be  
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statistically insignificant whereas mktliberalisedt+1 (Model 34) is statistically significant. Models 31 
and 34 have a high R-squared and seem to be the models that best fit the data.  
The last group of models (Models 36 through 42) have labour productivity as the dependent variable 
and are estimated using PW-PCSE. In this set of models neither mktliberalisedt+1 nor mktliberalisedt-1 
are found to be statistically significant. On the contrary, tvolumet is always statistically significant in 
this group of models. The t-statistics of tvolumet in Model 37 does not seem to be affected by the 
correlation between this variable and gdppercapt. Surprisingly, when gdppercapt is excluded, 
marketshareEt turns out not to be statistically significant (Model 38). The results regarding 
marketshareEt in Model 38 are consistent with those of Model 40. Nevertheless, Model 37 is preferred 
over Model 38 because of all the previous evidence regarding the significance of marketshareEt. Also, 
Model 37 has a very high explanatory power (R-squared=0.78). For the first time, publickt is not 
statistically significant in the selected model, i.e. Model 37. 
 
From the results presented above, it can be conclude that the response of the incumbent to 
liberalisation policies occurs either in the same year the policy comes into force or in the years that 
precede that event, that is, the incumbents may react to liberalisation policies in advance. 
Nevertheless, there is less evidence concerning the effect of the percentage of market liberalised 
forward one period (mktliberalisedt+1) than of the contemporaneous percentage of market liberalised 
(mktliberalisedt). It may happen that some of the investments in innovation are decided in advance but 
they are only observable in the following year(s).  
If the models that best fit the data are compared (selected models), i.e. Model 3, 10, 16, 23, 31, 34, and 
37, the models estimated by GLS provide stronger results. The use of one innovation measure instead 
of another does not originate significantly different results. This shows that the developed innovation 
index is a good measure of innovation and gives certain warranties about the quality of the models 
estimated. If different results had been found depending on the measure of innovation used it would be 
impossible to know which model (if any) was correct. 
All of the selected models indicate a positive effect of liberalisation on innovation. In all of these 
models, the degree of liberalisation is statistically significant and has a positive impact on innovation, 
i.e. the estimated coefficients have the expected signs.  
The actual competition, measured by the market share of the entrants, is always statistically significant 
among the selected models and also has a positive effect on innovation. As predicted, the larger the 
market share of the entrants, the more innovative the incumbent is, at least until the market share of 
the entrants reaches a certain threshold.   
In the selected models, the percentage of public ownership is always statistically significant but 
contrary to what was expected, the percentage of public ownership is negatively related to innovation. 
This does not necessarily mean that welfare maximisation does not stimulate innovation. It can mean 
that public ownership is not the ownership structure most likely to promote welfare maximisation. In 
other words, under the hypothesis that public ownership creates more incentives to innovate than 
private ownership is the assumption that governments are likely to maximise social welfare, which in 
reality may not always be true. Moreover, the variable “percentage of public ownership” presents 
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almost no variability and, therefore, all the results related to this variable should be seen as preliminary 
and taken with considerable caution. 
Concerning the letter volume handled by the operators, there is strong statistical evidence that it has a 
positive impact on the incentives to innovate.  
GDP per capita is always statistically significant and has a positive sign, which means that the larger 
the GDP per capita, the more innovative the incumbent is. This reflects the fact that in the most 
developed economies and countries with higher standards of living, the general level of investment in 
innovation tends to be higher. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While the process of liberalising the postal sector was initiated a decade ago in Europe, the impact of 
liberalisation and competition on efficiency and innovation have not been assessed yet. 
This paper aims at contributing to the literature with empirical evidence on the effect of both 
liberalisation and competition on innovation in the postal sector. The impacts of private ownership and 
of market size are also analysed. 
To this end a dataset, which constitutes a unique source of information for analysing the liberalisation 
process, the development of competition and the development of innovation in the postal sector in the 
last decade, is put together. The dataset embraces data for seventeen European countries, over ten 
years. Three measures are used as proxies for innovation: (1) an innovation index based on the results 
of a survey developed for this purpose; (2) the accumulated number of innovations (based on that 
same survey) and; (3) labour productivity. We also develop a liberalisation index, which allows us to 
measure the percentage of market liberalised (in terms of letter volume). 
Several models are estimated by GLS and using PW-PCSE. In general, the models estimated have a 
high explanatory power. We find evidence that market liberalisation has a positive effect on 
innovation. This finding supports the idea that the threat of competition (or potential competition) on 
its own induces firms to be efficient.  
We also find evidence that an increase in the market share of the competitors stimulates the investment 
in innovation, at least until the market share of the competitors reaches a certain threshold. Since 
competition is not very developed in the postal sector it is not possible to draw conclusions for the 
cases where the competitors have a larger market share. Nevertheless, it is also found evidence of the 
positive impact that mail volume has on the introduction of innovative processes. One can anticipate 
that if the incumbents lose a considerable part of their market share it will be more difficult to have the 
means to invest in innovation and to recover the investments made. 
The GDP per capita turns out to be very significant and to have a positive relationship with innovation 
in all the models. 
Further work could introduce work-sharing (upstream access) and downstream access, as explanatory 
variables in the model. It would also be interesting to replicate this study for other network industries, 
in particular the ones where competition is more developed. 
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ANNEX 1 - Questionnaire 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill in the dates when each of the innovations was introduced into operation. If the innovation was not introduced yet please write 
“NA”. 
 
Innovation 
 
Specificities 
 
Part of value chain 
concerned 
Year of 
introduction into 
operation 
(not test or pilot) 
Remarks 
(Please write here any 
remarks or notes 
regarding your answers) 
Optimisation of collection routes (using software)        Collection/ transportation   
Hybrid mail [1]  Collection/ all value chain   
Digital stamp [2]  Franking   
Used to identify trucks Upstream/ transportation   
Used to identify trolleys Upstream/ transportation   
Used to identify trays or bags upstream/transportation   
 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID): 
Used to monitor the performance of the 
letter post [3] Upstream/ transportation   
That can read all front side of the letter Sorting   
That can read hand-written whole addresses Sorting   
That can read hand-written postal codes Sorting   
 
 
Automated sorting machines using Optical Character 
Recognition (OCR): That can read machine written postal codes 
and whole addresses Sorting   
Online coding Sorting   
Video coded address reading equipment [5]: Scanning and remote coding (off-line video 
coding equipment) Sorting   
Automated sequence sorting to delivery route [4]  Sorting/ delivery   
Automatic tray handling systems  Material handling   
Automated guided vehicles (AGV) [6]  Material handling   
Route planning and optimization software for delivery  Delivery   
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[1] Customers digitally send the information to be printed to the Postal Service Provider, which then sorts the mail electronically, prints it and dispatches it in 
physical form into the conventional mail stream from the site closest to the delivery point. Conversely, hard copy mail can be scanned in and sent on directly 
to an online account. Hybrid mail offers particular advantages for direct-marketing and large-scale mailings. Most of the costs involved in the physical 
handling of traditional paper mail are cut, since the data is handled in real time in electronic form until the final phase of the process, when it is printed on 
paper and physically delivered to the recipient. 
[2] A digital stamp, in mail or philately, is similar to a conventional postage stamp except it is resident on or in a computer. A digital stamp can typically be 
downloaded and printed onto envelopes or packages by authorized individuals. 
[3] RFID tags monitor test letters at key points in the mail processing pipeline. It highlights bottlenecks so that postal operators can free them and speed up the 
mail flow. Test letters with RFID tags in them are seeded into normal mail flow and operators do not know which have the tags in them, ensuring objectivity 
and reliable results. 
[4] This is a letter sorting system to extend mechanization to delivery route sequencing, the last operation in the processing cycle. The goal of sequencing 
systems is to automatically sort mail into delivery point sequence with an aim to significantly cut back on the amount of time a letter carrier needs to spend in 
the office casing mail.  
[5] Video coded address reading equipment: 
Unreadable addresses, e.g. cursive not distinguished by the OCR, unreadable machine print or unmatchable to the address database, are digitally imaged and 
1) processed by human operators online (online coding), or 2) sent on to a Remote Encoding Centre (REC) and processed by human operators there (scanning 
and remote coding) (Arthur D. Little Limited, 2004). 
[6] Automated guided vehicles (AGVs): 
AGVs are transport systems capable of functioning without driver operation. AGVs are used within sorting offices to move mail around. AGVs find their way 
without a person behind the wheel by using laser guidance, wall-mounted reflectors, and a computer-based human controller running the routing software. 
They can also be run on magnetic paths; this does leave less flexibility for maneuver but can be safer when interacting with employees. While the vehicles can 
be programmed to follow a set route, it is also possible for employees to divert the AGVs if required. The vehicles can determine if there are loads waiting at 
set points by the change in area contrast and load monitor systems preclude uneven or overloading. Robotics can also be used to sleeve, lid, unsleeve and unlid 
mail packages at each end of the transportation process (Arthur D. Little Limited, 2004). 
ANNEX 2- Results 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable 
 
  
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Observations 
country overall 9 5 1 17 N=204 
 between  5 1 17 n=17 
 within  0 9 9 T=12 
year overall 2001 3 1995 2006 N=204 
 between  0 2001 2001 n=17 
 within  3 1995 2006 T=12 
mktliberalised overall 34 37 0 100 N=204 
 between  37 3 100 n=17 
 within  9 12 105 T=12 
mktshareE overall 2 2 1 11 N=187 
 between  2 1 8 n=17 
 within  1 -2 6 T=11 
publick overall 95 17 10 100 N=204 
 between  17 34 100 n=17 
 within  6 64 118 T=12 
tvolume overall 6 8 0 29 N=187 
 between  8 0 27 n=17 
 within  1 4 8 T=11 
popdens overall 120 95 15 393 N=187 
 between  97 15 383 n=17 
 within  2 109 130 T=11 
gdppercap overall 15 11 1 38 N=187 
 between  11 1 36 n=17 
 within  1 9 19 T=11 
inindex overall -5 5 -15 5 N=204 
 between  4 -11 3 n=17 
 within  2 -10 2 T=12 
accuminno overall 6 4 0 13 N=204 
 between  3 1 10 n=17 
 within  3 0 14 T=12 
itemperempl overall 66 41 4 166 N=187 
 between  41 7 133 n=17 
 within  12 31 103 T=11 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix. 
 
mktliberalised mktshareE publick tvolume popdens gdppercap 
mktliberalised 1      
mktshareE 0.5438 1     
publick 0.0409 -0.1267 1    
tvolume -0.1522 0.0063 -0.1549 1   
popdens -0.3423 -0.1162 -0.7258 0.462 1  
gdppercap 0.1220 0.1336 -0.2803 0.4819 0.3787 1 
 
Table 8: Summary of the heteroskedasticity and correlation tests performed. 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Explanatory 
varibles 
 
Likelihood-ratio test 
for 
heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Modified Wald test  
 
Wooldridge test 
LR chi(16)= 88.38 chi2(17)= 5720.62 F(1,16)= 85.61 
inindex 
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
LR chi(16)= 113.16 chi2(17)= 682.77 F(1,16)= 67.11 
accuminno 
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
LR chi(16)= 312.75 chi2(17)= 87332.65 F(1,16)= 95.70 
itemperempl 
 
 
Xit
Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>chi2= 0 Prob>F= 0 
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Table 9: Results of GLS estimation with inindex as dependent variable. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
mktliberalisedt 0.009 0.017 0.037 0.040    
 
(1.07) (1.79)* (3.74)*** (3.81)***    
mktshareEt 0.351 0.375 0.478  0.645 0.525 0.388 
 
(4.83)*** (4.26)*** (6.37)***  (8.21)*** (6.68)*** (4.43)*** 
publickt -0.108 -0.093 -0.087 -0.094 -0.073 -0.075 -0.072 
 
(4.80)*** (26.89)*** (11.97)*** (11.07)*** (9.97)*** (8.77)*** (11.36)*** 
tvolumet 0.084 0.090 0.298 0.259 0.252 0.384 0.237 
 
(1.46) (1.37) (8.88)*** (7.25)*** (12.17)*** (3.82)*** (7.25)*** 
popdenst -0.021       
 
(2.94)***       
gdppercapt 0.304 0.192      
 
(3.84)*** (2.51)**      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.016  
 
     (2.02)**  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.019 
 
      (1.64)* 
Constant 
2.436  -1.127 0.142 -0.895 -1.492 -0.591 
 
(0.97)  (1.91)* (0.26) (1.68)* (1.83)* (1.33) 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
1192 - - 1171 - 1215 1264 
Wald chi2 
379 1108 219 213 192 210 148 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 10: Results of GLS estimation with accuminno as dependent variable. 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
mktliberalisedt 0.006 -0.016 0.019 0.031    
 
(0.58) (1.57) (2.05)** (2.97)***    
mktshareEt 0.439 0.517 0.534  0.550 0.387 0.051 
 
(5.79)*** (7.60)*** (4.56)***  (6.00)*** (4.24)*** (0.81) 
publickt -0.056 -0.022 0.000 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.012 
 
(2.76)*** (2.15)** (0.01) (2.78)*** (2.63)*** (1.10) (1.49) 
tvolumet -0.032 0.066 0.274 0.196 0.236 0.278 0.238 
 
(0.52) (1.22) (7.87)*** (1.98)** (2.64)*** (8.38)*** (5.86)*** 
popdenst 0.039       
 
(2.25)**       
gdppercapt 0.398 0.354      
 
(5.65)*** (7.31)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.020  
 
     (2.95)***  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.063 
 
      (7.75)*** 
Constant 
       
 
       
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
1184 1179 1181 1179 - 1158 1266 
Wald chi2 
1031 1286 263 19 145 745 298 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
          * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 11: Results of GLS estimation with itemperempl as dependent variable. 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
mktliberalisedt 0.020 0.051 0.021 0.081    
 
(0.92) (2.06)** (0.64) (2.67)***    
mktshareEt 1.944 2.168 1.056  1.728 1.194 0.615 
 
(7.51)*** (6.59)*** (2.63)***  (5.47)*** (7.12)** (1.51) 
publickt -0.251 -0.253 -0.257 -0.282 -0.413 -0.368 -0.751 
 
(6.69)*** (6.04)*** (4.95)*** (7.21)*** (7.37)*** (13.25)*** (18.77)*** 
tvolumet 2.412 1.735 2.074 2.261 2.640 2.664 2.512 
 
(7.97)*** (5.91)*** (7.57)*** (9.51)*** (12.37)*** (20.28)*** (11.59)*** 
popdenst 0.032       
 
(2.18)**       
gdppercapt 2.180 2.346      
 
(16.33)*** (16.07)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.006  
 
     (0.58)  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.221 
 
      (5.71)*** 
Constant 
38.482 43.261 77.393 79.528 78.790 74.990 105.667 
 
(9.60)*** (9.54)*** (10.82)*** (12.06)*** (12.60)*** (18.29)*** (19.49)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
Log likelihood 
920 923 891 832 - - 916 
Wald chi2 
7026 2031 95 146 261 741 856 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
    * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 12: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with inindex as dependent variable. 
 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
mktliberalisedt 0.032 0.030 0.040 0.032    
 
(2.71)*** (2.25)** (2.59)*** (2.56)***    
mktshareEt 0.276 0.290 0.265  0.388 0.285 0.254 
 
(2.97)*** (3.20)*** (2.97)***  (3.95)*** (3.24)*** (2.86)*** 
publickt -0.021 -0.038 -0.071 -0.088 -0.062 -0.072 -0.063 
 
(1.06) (3.33)*** (4.26)*** (7.08)*** (3.75)*** (4.50)*** (3.96)*** 
tvolumet -0.050 0.045 0.225 0.242 0.248 0.203 0.228 
 
(0.35) (0.28) (1.38) (4.37)*** (1.59) (1.38) (1.39) 
popdenst 0.002       
 
(0.38)       
gdppercapt 0.284 0.252      
 
(7.71)*** (5.57)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.035  
 
     (2.47)**  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.036 
 
      (2.18)** 
Constant 
-8.438 -6.616 -1.452 0.357 -1.094 -1.283 -2.291 
 
(3.69)*** (6.39)*** (0.99) (0.39) (0.75) (0.96) (1.68)* 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.64 0.65 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.39 0.41 
Wald chi2 
139 140 58 94 39 59 50 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
          * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 13: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with accuminno as dependent variable. 
 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 
mktliberalisedt 0.020 0.011 0.023 0.027    
 
(1.44) (1.00) (1.74)* (2.16)**    
mktshareEt 0.356 0.326 0.264  0.328 0.266 0.160 
 
(3.30)*** (3.15)*** (2.44)**  (2.94)*** (2.51)** (2.24)** 
publickt 0.003 -0.033 -0.056 -0.070 -0.049 -0.060 -0.048 
 
(0.16) (2.81)*** (3.68)*** (5.46)*** (3.37)*** (4.06)*** (2.80)*** 
tvolumet 0.238 0.281 0.290 0.196 0.301 0.246 0.265 
 
(1.20) (1.57) (1.99)** (2.72)*** (2.05)** (1.90)* (1.94)* 
popdenst 0.009       
 
(1.79)*       
gdppercapt 0.171 0.174      
 
(4.87)*** (5.24)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.024  
 
     (1.82)*  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.018 
 
      (1.41) 
Constant 
-1.596 3.240 7.732 9.452 7.931 8.064 7.586 
 
(0.51) (2.55)** (5.78)*** (11.51)*** (5.92)*** (6.77)*** (5.40)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.56 0.61 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.55 0.19 
Wald chi2 
114 125 53 50 43 52 34 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
        * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 14: Results of PW-PCSE estimation with itemperempl as dependent variable. 
 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
mktliberalisedt 0.094 0.109 0.161 0.210    
 
(1.70)* (1.76)* (1.63)* (2.36)**    
mktshareEt 1.505 1.122 0.849  1.047 0.901 0.781 
 
(2.11)** (1.78)* (0.94)  (1.04) (1.02) (0.82) 
publickt 0.165 0.161 -0.167 -0.163 -0.214 -0.150 -0.231 
 
(1.06) (1.38) (1.12) (1.21) (1.31) (1.05) (1.61)* 
tvolumet 5.816 5.418 2.210 2.393 2.546 1.976 1.961 
 
(4.28)*** (4.79)*** (5.46)*** (5.83)*** (7.85)*** (3.88)*** (5.00)*** 
popdenst -0.013       
 
(0.35)       
gdppercapt 2.307 2.366      
 
(8.47)*** (8.20)***      
mktliberalisedt+1      0.030  
 
     (0.48)  
mktliberalisedt-1       0.060 
 
      (0.65) 
Constant 
-5.368 -7.181 62.565 65.875 61.457 71.041 77.299 
 
(0.31) (0.57) (3.92)*** (4.60)*** (4.04)*** (4.70)*** (5.33)*** 
 
       
Observations 
187 187 187 187 187 187 170 
R-squared 
0.76 0.78 0.48 0.59 0.40 0.62 0.54 
Wald chi2 
212 207 35 37 63 17 25 
Prob>chi2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
     Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
     * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
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